Virtue ethics, rules, and consequences

A quick comparison among the three major frameworks for ethical living

Image under CC license.

What does it mean to be ethical? There are three major frameworks to answer that question: deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics.

(In the following I will use the words ethics and morality interchangeably, since “ethics” comes from the Greek ēthos, meaning either character or custom, a word that Cicero, in De Fato 2.1, translated into Latin as moralis, meaning proper behavior as well as, again, custom.)

Virtue ethics was developed by Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, and a number of other Hellenistic schools of thought. It is, arguably (but debatably) also present in some form in Eastern traditions like Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. If so, virtue ethics is one of the dominant ways to think about morality, particularly after the so-called “aretaic turn” (from arete, meaning virtue) in contemporary moral philosophy, which is usually traced to the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

Often enough comparative discussions of virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism go something like this: virtue ethics is about character; deontology is about duty and rules; and consequentialism is (obviously) about the consequences of one’s actions. This makes it sound like virtue ethicists don’t care about consequences and don’t recognize rules and duties. Which is not at all the case, and it is important to appreciate why. Before we can do that, let me briefly summarize the other two frameworks, with which virtue ethics is often contrasted.

Socrates, photo by the Author.

According to deontologists, what determines whether an action is moral or not is the fact that it does (or does not) align with certain duties or rules. For instance, in Judaism and Christianity an action is moral if it agrees with the Ten Commandments allegedly imparted to humanity by God. In the more recent and secular Kantian deontology there is only one commandment, the so-called categorical imperative, which is usually formulated in a couple of ways:

(I) Act only according to those maxims by which you can also will that they would become universal laws;

(II) Act in such a way that you always treat people, whether your own person or any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

Young Kant, image under CC license.

If you are a consequentialist, by contrast, you will say that what matters are the consequences of a given action, regardless of one’s intentions, rules, and duties. The standard example of consequentialism is the sort of utilitarianism formulated first by Jeremy Bentham and later modified by John Stuart Mill, the chief modern champion of which is Peter Singer, although the ancient Greek orator Demosthenes can reasonably be considered a forerunner, as he said “Every advantage in the past is judged in the light of the final issue” (Olynthiacs; Philippics (1930), translated by James Herbert Vince, p. 11). Bentham explained the concept in this fashion:

“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think.” (The Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789, chapter 1, p. 1)

Jeremy Bentham, image under CC license.

So, whatever action has the consequence of increasing pleasure, or decreasing pain, for most people is thereby recognized as a moral action. Do you recognize the influence of Epicurus?

Let us now contrast the above we virtue ethics. In that framework, the focus is neither on actions, nor on duties and rules, nor on consequences. The focus is on one’s character, which means on one’s behavioral tendency to act in certain ways rather than others.

For instance, is someone is regarded as generous it means that, other things being equal, that person gives to others more than would be expected, thus displaying kindness. The corresponding vice is that of selfishness, which means that someone lacks consideration for others and is concerned mainly with his own pleasure and interests.

This emphasis on character means that virtue ethicists are preoccupied with the agent’s intentions, not with the consequences of their actions. The reason for this is that we are fully responsible for what we mean to do, but not necessarily for the resulting outcomes. As the Stoic philosopher Epictetus famously put it:

“Some things are up to us and some are not. Up to us are judgment, inclination, desire, aversion—in short, whatever is our own doing. Not up to us are our bodies, possessions, reputations, public offices—in short, whatever isn’t our own doing.” (Handbook, 1)

Note, therefore, what is arguably the major difference between virtue ethics and the other two frameworks: deontology and consequentialism emphasize the nature of the action, while the attention in virtue ethics is squarely on the character of the agent. That said, does this mean that virtue ethicists don’t care about duties, rules, and consequences? No, of course not.

Let’s start with duties. In Stoicism, for instance, we have a duty to engage in kathēkonta, that is, appropriate actions, meaning actions that stem from virtuous intentions. (The virtue, again, lies in the intention of the agent, not in the action itself.)

Moreover, Stoics do follow general rules. Here is a partial list compiled by Seneca:

“I will look upon death or upon a comedy with the same expression of countenance: I will submit to labors, however great they may be, supporting the strength of my body by that of my mind: I will despise riches when I have them as much as when I have them not; if they be elsewhere I will not be more gloomy, if they sparkle around me I will not be more lively than I should otherwise be: whether Fortune comes or goes I will take no notice of her: I will view all lands as though they belong to me, and my own as though they belonged to all mankind.” (On the Happy Life, 20)

Unlike the Big Ten, these rules don’t come from God. And unlike Kant’s categorical imperative they are not generated by pure reason. They are, rather, rules of thumb, good practical precepts dictated by personal experience processed within the general framework of virtue ethics.

Finally, consequences. Of course virtue ethicists care about consequences! But we are also wise enough to know that we don’t have ultimate jurisdiction over them. We are not as arrogant (or naive) as consequentialists who think that they can somehow calculate or predict long-term chains of causes and effects. The world is too complicated for that, events are too subject to serendipity.

Which is why Stoics make commitments that are always accompanied by the reserve clause. Seneca, again (italics are mine):

"I will set sail unless anything happens to prevent me; I shall be praetor, if nothing hinders me; my financial operations will succeed, unless anything goes wrong with them. This is why we say that nothing befalls the wise person which they did not expect—we do not make them exempt from the chances of human life, but from its mistakes, nor does everything happen to them as they wished it would, but as they thought it would: now their first thought was that their purpose might meet with some resistance, and the pain of disappointed wishes must affect a person’s mind less severely if they have not been at all events confident of success.” (Of Peace of Mind, 13)

So virtue ethics does make room for duties, rules, and consequences. But they are taken as suggestive and not absolute, regarded as objects of aspiration, not mandatory goalposts. The result is a flexible yet pragmatically useful approach to ethical decision making, and one that is increasingly being recognized again as a very powerful way to live one’s life.