Honestly, I think Aristotle is in a bind. On the one hand, clearly externals are essential to his conception of eudaimonia. On the other hand, he explicitly says at NE 1099b24 that it is a mistake to entrust the greatest things to chance. This follows upon his earlier assertion, in 1095b26-27, that the good is our own and hard to take from us. So, I think he fudges things by adding this new category of "blessedness." Priam is happy but not blessed.
FWIW, I think Julia Anna's older book, The Morality of Happiness, brings out this tension in Aristotle. As a result, there really are two ways to go: (a) the Theophrastus route and say that Priam is unhappy because he lost all the externals; (b) the Stoic route and say that Priam is happy because he is a good man.
Brian, yes, precisely! I take Theophrastus's to be what we mean nowadays by the "Aristotelian" position. And I go with the Stoics. Thanks for clarifying!
Not really. What they are showing is a positive emotional state in the moment. But they have no concept of a life project, and of what makes that project meaningful. (Nor could they, they are children!) The problem is that we use the word "happiness" in all these cases even though it means very different things. One thing is to say "I'm so happy to see you!" and an entirely different one is to say "I'm happy about my life and where it's going." Most ancient philosophers, and modern positive psychologists, are concerned with the latter, not the former.
So then, how do you think we should evaluate children that had started to develop/understand such concepts/virtues/etc. on at least a surface level, but by (great) misfortune, had their lives cut short?
Like a child who tries to help their friends and families, but if asked can only explain, "because I like this person".
Should they be mourned (within limits, of course) but still be considered to have been a wasted life? Or can we still say that while unfortunately they hadn't been able to live life to its' fullest, it was still meaningful, however little? Or am I thinking too old of a child?
Willy, not sure. I'm not an Aristotelian myself. For Aristotle the bar for a life to count as eudaimonic is high, for the Stoics it's lower. I go with the Stoic take.
Yes, the concept certainly pre-dates Aristotle, though it is a logical consequence of his comprehensive ethical philosophy. In fact, he would say that someone's eudaimonia can go down the drain even *after* one is dead, if some new damning piece of information about his life comes to light.
For what it is worth, I think Aristotle really struggles about the Priam question. Consider what he says in I.10:
"If activities are, as we have said, what determines the character of life, no blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable — though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam."
Honestly, I think Aristotle is in a bind. On the one hand, clearly externals are essential to his conception of eudaimonia. On the other hand, he explicitly says at NE 1099b24 that it is a mistake to entrust the greatest things to chance. This follows upon his earlier assertion, in 1095b26-27, that the good is our own and hard to take from us. So, I think he fudges things by adding this new category of "blessedness." Priam is happy but not blessed.
FWIW, I think Julia Anna's older book, The Morality of Happiness, brings out this tension in Aristotle. As a result, there really are two ways to go: (a) the Theophrastus route and say that Priam is unhappy because he lost all the externals; (b) the Stoic route and say that Priam is happy because he is a good man.
Brian, yes, precisely! I take Theophrastus's to be what we mean nowadays by the "Aristotelian" position. And I go with the Stoics. Thanks for clarifying!
I'm no expert on Aristotle, to be sure, but I'd swear (OK, affirm) that I've seen happy children. Just saying.
Ah, that’s an easy one: they think they’re happy because they don’t know anything… 😃
Methinks that at least some of the joyful little ones I’ve seen are showing something more interesting and profound than the bliss of ignorance.
Not really. What they are showing is a positive emotional state in the moment. But they have no concept of a life project, and of what makes that project meaningful. (Nor could they, they are children!) The problem is that we use the word "happiness" in all these cases even though it means very different things. One thing is to say "I'm so happy to see you!" and an entirely different one is to say "I'm happy about my life and where it's going." Most ancient philosophers, and modern positive psychologists, are concerned with the latter, not the former.
So then, how do you think we should evaluate children that had started to develop/understand such concepts/virtues/etc. on at least a surface level, but by (great) misfortune, had their lives cut short?
Like a child who tries to help their friends and families, but if asked can only explain, "because I like this person".
Should they be mourned (within limits, of course) but still be considered to have been a wasted life? Or can we still say that while unfortunately they hadn't been able to live life to its' fullest, it was still meaningful, however little? Or am I thinking too old of a child?
Willy, not sure. I'm not an Aristotelian myself. For Aristotle the bar for a life to count as eudaimonic is high, for the Stoics it's lower. I go with the Stoic take.
Yet no man is called happy till his death, and all The taxes at his wake and funeral paid.
Ovid, The Metamorphoses, Book III, Cadmus
In Montaigne, Book I, Chapter 19, trans. M. A. Screech
Originally Solon, 6th century BC?
Yes, the concept certainly pre-dates Aristotle, though it is a logical consequence of his comprehensive ethical philosophy. In fact, he would say that someone's eudaimonia can go down the drain even *after* one is dead, if some new damning piece of information about his life comes to light.
For what it is worth, I think Aristotle really struggles about the Priam question. Consider what he says in I.10:
"If activities are, as we have said, what determines the character of life, no blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable — though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam."
Thanks Brian! Another example of Aristotle trying to reach some kind of middle ground?