As we read and think about moral compasses, the recent essay by David Brooks in the September Atlantic asks the touhgh questions, but more how our nation has lost its compass. Long read longer narration but asks essential questions
This is a tough snake to grab! I will write now using actual examples. Yesterday, I had an argument—not in the hostile sense often connoted—that I found it unreasonable for a Finnish woman I met in Crete on holiday 30 years ago to be paid to be beaten by a middle eastern prince in Paris. (Stay with me.😊) I felt that it was not worth the money because she risked severe injury. A filmmaker introduced me to a screenwriter last week whom I met the other night. We talked in mutual agreement condoning suicide and being pro (in favor of) people choosing to be sex workers. I believe these fall as acceptable (within reason) in Stoic philosophy. She then said it was the right (or prerogative) of my Finnish friend to choose to be beaten, and that I should be supportive. I couldn’t then, and I doubt I can now. Why, though? Am I not asking the right questions to myself about my judgements? After all, if I accept suicide—and I do in dire cases—how illogical for me not to accept being beaten nearly to death? How do I clear this imaginary mess up? 🤷🏻♂️
Mike, ah, a tough one indeed! I have a couple of suggestions, though.
First, let us remember that the point of virtue ethics is not to judge others, but only to improve our own character. So, in a sense, what we think of the Finnish woman or the sex worker is irrelevant.
Second, from the perspective of the agent, the question should be not "is this moral or immoral?" but rather "is this going to make me a better or worse person?" Personally, agreeing to be beaten, or selling my body for money, would both undermine my character, so I won't do it. But things may be different for others.
Lastly, suicide for the Stoics is indeed acceptable, but only under extreme circumstances and, again, the judgment has to be made by the agent on the basis of his/her best evaluation of such circumstances.
I read and listened to this piece just after I read an opinion piece in the New York Times by Agnes Callard entitled "I Teach the Humanities, and I Still Don't Know What Their Value Is." The thesis of the NYT piece seems to be that advocacy for the Humanities is inimical to the spirit of inquiry that is central to the humanities. I wonder about that. This podcast ends with an argument for education in the humanities, an argument worth making, I'd say.
Randall, yeah, I read that article by Callard as well. Honestly, it pissed me off. I had to exercise a good amount of Stoic restrain about it. This is not the first time that Callard takes contrarian positions, just for the hell of being a contrarian, I suspect. I'm considering whether to respond here on Substack (a letter to the NYT would likely have to be too brief, and it's unlikely to get published). Or simply let it go...
As we read and think about moral compasses, the recent essay by David Brooks in the September Atlantic asks the touhgh questions, but more how our nation has lost its compass. Long read longer narration but asks essential questions
Thanks for the suggestion!
Reading , listening to the wide variety of opinions today on 1 st ammendment, perhaps this insight would help
🤞
This is a tough snake to grab! I will write now using actual examples. Yesterday, I had an argument—not in the hostile sense often connoted—that I found it unreasonable for a Finnish woman I met in Crete on holiday 30 years ago to be paid to be beaten by a middle eastern prince in Paris. (Stay with me.😊) I felt that it was not worth the money because she risked severe injury. A filmmaker introduced me to a screenwriter last week whom I met the other night. We talked in mutual agreement condoning suicide and being pro (in favor of) people choosing to be sex workers. I believe these fall as acceptable (within reason) in Stoic philosophy. She then said it was the right (or prerogative) of my Finnish friend to choose to be beaten, and that I should be supportive. I couldn’t then, and I doubt I can now. Why, though? Am I not asking the right questions to myself about my judgements? After all, if I accept suicide—and I do in dire cases—how illogical for me not to accept being beaten nearly to death? How do I clear this imaginary mess up? 🤷🏻♂️
Mike, ah, a tough one indeed! I have a couple of suggestions, though.
First, let us remember that the point of virtue ethics is not to judge others, but only to improve our own character. So, in a sense, what we think of the Finnish woman or the sex worker is irrelevant.
Second, from the perspective of the agent, the question should be not "is this moral or immoral?" but rather "is this going to make me a better or worse person?" Personally, agreeing to be beaten, or selling my body for money, would both undermine my character, so I won't do it. But things may be different for others.
Lastly, suicide for the Stoics is indeed acceptable, but only under extreme circumstances and, again, the judgment has to be made by the agent on the basis of his/her best evaluation of such circumstances.
Well said...this time! 😄😊👍
😆
I read and listened to this piece just after I read an opinion piece in the New York Times by Agnes Callard entitled "I Teach the Humanities, and I Still Don't Know What Their Value Is." The thesis of the NYT piece seems to be that advocacy for the Humanities is inimical to the spirit of inquiry that is central to the humanities. I wonder about that. This podcast ends with an argument for education in the humanities, an argument worth making, I'd say.
Randall, yeah, I read that article by Callard as well. Honestly, it pissed me off. I had to exercise a good amount of Stoic restrain about it. This is not the first time that Callard takes contrarian positions, just for the hell of being a contrarian, I suspect. I'm considering whether to respond here on Substack (a letter to the NYT would likely have to be too brief, and it's unlikely to get published). Or simply let it go...
let it go...it's not only not a reasonable argument. it is silly gibberish.
I agree. But it’s influential gibberish, being published in the NYT.
Not imo;The Grey Lady ain’t what she was…