So are you suggesting that the Epicureans believed in determinism, chance and free will, but the Stoics believed in determinism and free will? I follow your point respecting chance, that “chance” isn’t really “chance,” and could be predicted with enough information - i.e., the outcome is predetermined - making the point that the Stoic philosophy leans heavily in the direction of determinism. I think this distinction between these schools is of huge importance, because what is the “Swerve,” on which so much of Epicurean metaphysics hangs, if not chance? But then you add a twist at the end and seem to say that while the Stoics believed in “outward” determinism, they believed in “inward” free will (in your words, our brains make decisions). I’ve never really understood that. It’s always felt to me like so much of modern thinking in this regard. Everything points towards determinism, but then when that path is followed and people get to the question of human agency, they sort of lose their nerve because of the consequences of believing in pure determinism, and so just sort of assert (without argument) that we have inward free will or some such thing, because that “feels right” and is consistent with our lived experience. Is that what is happening here?
David, both the Epicureans and the Stoics were determinists. They dealt with the issue of human volition differently (and, in my opinion, the Stoics did it better).
The Epicureans introduced an arbitrary generator of free will, the infamous swerve. That’s very much akin to a modern Christian who accepts the laws of physics but thinks that human volition is an exception (so called contra causal free will).
The Stoics simply parceled causes further, into proximate and distant, local and universal, as well as internal and external.
What this does, in line with modern compatibilism, is to accept determinism while still distinguishing between actions that I am forced to do (e.g., someone raised my arm by pushing it upwards) and actions I do of my own volition (e.g., raising my arm because I decided to do so).
I think "it was determined" is misleading, or at least unhelpful. You raising your arm is the result of a series of cause-effect, some of which are external to you, some internal. To the extent that there are internal causes that's your decision.
So are you suggesting that the Epicureans believed in determinism, chance and free will, but the Stoics believed in determinism and free will? I follow your point respecting chance, that “chance” isn’t really “chance,” and could be predicted with enough information - i.e., the outcome is predetermined - making the point that the Stoic philosophy leans heavily in the direction of determinism. I think this distinction between these schools is of huge importance, because what is the “Swerve,” on which so much of Epicurean metaphysics hangs, if not chance? But then you add a twist at the end and seem to say that while the Stoics believed in “outward” determinism, they believed in “inward” free will (in your words, our brains make decisions). I’ve never really understood that. It’s always felt to me like so much of modern thinking in this regard. Everything points towards determinism, but then when that path is followed and people get to the question of human agency, they sort of lose their nerve because of the consequences of believing in pure determinism, and so just sort of assert (without argument) that we have inward free will or some such thing, because that “feels right” and is consistent with our lived experience. Is that what is happening here?
David, both the Epicureans and the Stoics were determinists. They dealt with the issue of human volition differently (and, in my opinion, the Stoics did it better).
The Epicureans introduced an arbitrary generator of free will, the infamous swerve. That’s very much akin to a modern Christian who accepts the laws of physics but thinks that human volition is an exception (so called contra causal free will).
The Stoics simply parceled causes further, into proximate and distant, local and universal, as well as internal and external.
What this does, in line with modern compatibilism, is to accept determinism while still distinguishing between actions that I am forced to do (e.g., someone raised my arm by pushing it upwards) and actions I do of my own volition (e.g., raising my arm because I decided to do so).
Does this mean that I decided to raise my arm (and did so) but it was determined that I was going to do so anyway?
I think "it was determined" is misleading, or at least unhelpful. You raising your arm is the result of a series of cause-effect, some of which are external to you, some internal. To the extent that there are internal causes that's your decision.